A Model of Microfinance Regulation in a Mission Drift Context
Abstract
This paper analyzes the problem of mission drift of risk averse microfinance institutions (MFIs) facing exogenous regulatory constraints. We develop a static portfolio model generalized to MFIs whose objective function has a double financial and social dimension. This model highlights a solidarity-return trade-off and allows us to determine the degree of mission drift of the MFI as the optimal proportion of the poorest in its micro-credit portfolio. The regulatory constraints lead to mission drift of MFIs by increasing the perceived risk of the poorest and the risk aversion of IMF, and/or by decreasing the loan return on the poorest. In order to curb mission drift in microfinance, regulatory inflection measures are recommended: the perceived risk reduction in microfinance sector, promoting certain financial innovations (quasi-capital, subsidized loans) and organizational innovations (two-headed structure of co-production) that strengthen the pro-social behavior of IMFs.
Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.15640/jeds.v6n1a6
Abstract
This paper analyzes the problem of mission drift of risk averse microfinance institutions (MFIs) facing exogenous regulatory constraints. We develop a static portfolio model generalized to MFIs whose objective function has a double financial and social dimension. This model highlights a solidarity-return trade-off and allows us to determine the degree of mission drift of the MFI as the optimal proportion of the poorest in its micro-credit portfolio. The regulatory constraints lead to mission drift of MFIs by increasing the perceived risk of the poorest and the risk aversion of IMF, and/or by decreasing the loan return on the poorest. In order to curb mission drift in microfinance, regulatory inflection measures are recommended: the perceived risk reduction in microfinance sector, promoting certain financial innovations (quasi-capital, subsidized loans) and organizational innovations (two-headed structure of co-production) that strengthen the pro-social behavior of IMFs.
Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.15640/jeds.v6n1a6
Browse Journals
Journal Policies
Information
Useful Links
- Call for Papers
- Submit Your Paper
- Publish in Your Native Language
- Subscribe the Journal
- Frequently Asked Questions
- Contact the Executive Editor
- Recommend this Journal to Librarian
- View the Current Issue
- View the Previous Issues
- Recommend this Journal to Friends
- Recommend a Special Issue
- Comment on the Journal
- Publish the Conference Proceedings
Latest Activities
Resources
Visiting Status
Today | 11 |
Yesterday | 303 |
This Month | 6491 |
Last Month | 12483 |
All Days | 1921167 |
Online | 8 |