Factor Price Manipulation, Bureaucratic Corruption, and State Capacity
Abstract
This article uses ancient Chinese autocracy as a case to investigate the relation between politics and taxation. The result shows that, throughout Chinese history, most of the agricultural surplus of the people has been extracted by political elites through the channels of factor price manipulation and bureaucratic corruption.The key issue is not whether a high tax rate can promote growth, but rather whether the political regime is extractive or not. This provides a solid framework to explain why most developed countries impose significant tax burdens, as they function better than the weaker states in less developed countries.
Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.15640/jeds.v9n3a1
Abstract
This article uses ancient Chinese autocracy as a case to investigate the relation between politics and taxation. The result shows that, throughout Chinese history, most of the agricultural surplus of the people has been extracted by political elites through the channels of factor price manipulation and bureaucratic corruption.The key issue is not whether a high tax rate can promote growth, but rather whether the political regime is extractive or not. This provides a solid framework to explain why most developed countries impose significant tax burdens, as they function better than the weaker states in less developed countries.
Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.15640/jeds.v9n3a1
Browse Journals
Journal Policies
Information
Useful Links
- Call for Papers
- Submit Your Paper
- Publish in Your Native Language
- Subscribe the Journal
- Frequently Asked Questions
- Contact the Executive Editor
- Recommend this Journal to Librarian
- View the Current Issue
- View the Previous Issues
- Recommend this Journal to Friends
- Recommend a Special Issue
- Comment on the Journal
- Publish the Conference Proceedings
Latest Activities
Resources
Visiting Status
 Today |
437 |
| Yesterday |
268 |
| This Month |
1485 |
| Last Month |
9291 |
 All Days |
1881240 |
 Online |
63 |
