Journal of Economics and Development Studies

Non Neutralité Des Objectifs du Gouvernement Dans l’Efficacité De La Lutte Contre La Contrebande : Une Analyse Théorique
Alastaire Sèna ALINSATO

Abstract
Based on a principal-agent model, this paper shows that the level of smuggling activities deterrence effort required by the government from custom officers is higher when the government targets the tax revenue only. This effort is lower when the government aims to target the double objective of tax return and the level of welfare. Then, in the first case the fight against smuggling is more effective while it’s less effective in the second case. To conclude, the study suggests, for more effective smuggling activity deterrence, the use of economics measures to dissociate the individual welfare from smuggling activities and the use of deterrence measure to erode the rent associated with the smuggling activity.

Full Text: PDF     DOI: 10.15640/jeds.v4n3a3